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Capital Market Governance: How Do Security Laws 
Affect Market Performance? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the link between capital market governance (CMG) and several key 
measures of market performance.  Using detailed data from individual stock exchanges, 
we develop a composite CMG index that captures three dimensions of security laws: the 
degree of earnings opacity, the enforcement of insider laws, and the effect of removing 
short-selling restrictions.  We find that improvements in the CMG index are associated 
with decreases in the cost-of-equity capital (both implied and realized), increases in 
market liquidity (trading volume, market depth, and U.S. foreign investments), and 
increases in market pricing efficiency (reduced price synchronicity and IPO 
underpricing).  The results are quite consistent across individual components of CMG 
and over alternative market performance measures. 
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1. Introduction 
In an increasingly integrated global economy, interest in (and awareness of) good capital 
market regulation is on the rise.  While presumption of the damaging effects of bad 
market governance is widespread, direct evidence on its economic consequences has been 
more difficult to document.  Contributing to this problem is the elusive nature of 
governance.  Because the quality of capital market governance can be associated with a 
number of other country-level phenomena, its direct impact on the performance of stock 
markets may be difficult to isolate.  
 
In this paper, we examine how capital market regulations and their enforcement might 
affect a wide range of market performance measures.  We focus on exchange-based (or 
market-related) regulations, and coin the term capital market governance (CMG) to 
describe this aspect of a country’s regulatory environment.  Using detailed data collected 
from individual exchanges for the period 1969-1998, we construct a composite CMG 
index that varies over time, thus reflecting inter-temporal variations in the quality of 
market governance in each country.  We then examine the relation between changes in 
the CMG index and changes in market performance across countries. 
 
Our study consists of two-stages.  In the first stage, we use a unique data set gleaned from 
market regulators, exchange officials, and industry contacts, to construct a broad index of 
capital market governance.  Specifically, we exploit innovations developed in several 
recent studies to measure three dimensions of capital market governance: (1) a composite 
earnings opacity measure, (2) insider trading laws and their enforcement, and (3) 
relaxation of short-selling restrictions.  Figure 1 provides an overview of these market 
governance variables.   
 
In the second stage, we evaluate the impact of CMG on key dimensions of market 
performance.  Specifically, we use seven empirical proxies to capture three aspects of 
market performance: (1) Cost-of-capital (both implied and realized); (2) Market liquidity 
(including trading volume, market depth, and foreign ownership by U.S. investors); and 
 3
Pricing efficiency (including price synchronicity and IPO underpricing).  Figure 2 offers 
an overview of these performance measures and our empirical proxies.   
 
Our goal is to gain an overarching perspective on how changes in security laws can affect 
the returns shareholders demand, their willingness to trade, and the efficiency with which 
prices incorporate information.  Securities laws cover a wide spectrum of areas, including 
the distribution of securities, takeovers, stock market manipulations, insider trading, stock 
exchanges, and the activities of financial intermediaries.  We focus on three aspects of 
these regulations: earnings opacity, insider laws, and short-selling restrictions.  We 
examine how these laws individually affect a wide set of market performance metrics, 
and we evaluate their combined effect using a CMG index. 
 
A distinguishing feature of this study is the range of market performance measures we 
examine.  Prior studies have typically focused on the effect of individual laws on one or 
two aspects of market performance – e.g., the role of accounting disclosure laws on the 
cost-of-capital. However, regulatory decisions can hinge on potential trade-offs across 
different market performance metrics (e.g., the trade-off between pricing efficiency and 
market liquidity in the insider trading law debates).  From a policy perspective, it is 
important to know how regulatory changes might affect multiple aspects of market 
performance.1   
 
Our strategy is to examine several key dimensions of market performance, using multiple 
empirical proxies for each.  For example, in estimating changes in the cost-of-capital, we 
use both an implied approach based on discounted cash flow models (Bekaert and Harvey 
(2000); Lee, Ng, and Swaminathan (2003)), and a more traditional international asset 
pricing approach based on realized returns.  In measuring market liquidity, we examine 
changes in trading volume, market depth (volume scaled by volatility), as well as U.S. 
foreign investment.  Finally, in examining pricing efficiency, we use both a Morck et al. 
(2000) synchronicity measure, and a measure of the degree of underpricing in IPO 
                                                          
1 Our use of a composite CMG measure might also enhance the power of our tests.  For example, in 
assessing the potential impact of security laws on a country’s cost-of-capital, it seems sensible to use a 
composite measure of these laws rather than a variable that just reflects a single regulation. 
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offerings.  While none of these individual proxies might fully capture the underlying 
economic construct, the consistency of our results across multiple methods adds to their 
interpretability.   
 
To deal with the empirical challenge posed by country-level correlated omitted variables, 
we designed our tests to capture inter-temporal changes in a country’s securities laws.  
By estimating most of our models with fixed-country effects, we use each country as its 
own control.  We are thus able to isolate inter-temporal fluctuations in the CMG index, 
and evaluate the effect of changes in a country’s CMG index on changes in its cost-of-
equity, market liquidity and pricing efficiency over time.2   
 
We find that after controlling for other factors, improvements in the CMG index are 
associated with economically significant decreases in the cost-of-equity capital.  The 
estimated economic magnitude of the effect is similar across the two cost-of-capital 
measures – using the implied estimation method, the cost of equity decreases by 2.6% per 
standard deviation increase in CMG; using the average realized returns from an 
international asset pricing model, the effect is 2.9% per standard deviation increase in 
CMG.  While not all three components of the CMG index are individually significant in 
every regression specification, the directional inferences are always the same: 
improvements in earnings opacity, insider trading, and short-selling laws result in lower 
costs of capital.   
 
In addition, we find that improvements in the CMG index are positively correlated with 
three measures of market liquidity.  Specifically, improved CMG is associated with 
increases in trading volume, market depth (i.e., volume divided by volatility), as well as 
the level of U.S. stockholdings (suggesting that countries with improving governance 
laws attract more U.S. investors).   Once again, all three components of the CMG index 
contribute to these overall results.  The directional inferences are consistent for the 
                                                          
2 We conduct country fixed-effect regressions whenever data permit.  Specifically, all tests involving the 
cost-of-capital (both implied and realized) and market liquidity (both trading volume and market depth) are 
estimated with country fixed-effect regressions.  The pricing efficiency tests (price synchronicity and IPO 
underpricing) and the U.S. foreign investment test are based on cross-sectional regressions. 
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earnings opacity, insider trading, and short-selling variables, even when each is 
individually included in the same regression. 
 
Finally, we find that the CMG index is negatively correlated with pricing synchronicity 
(Morck et al. (2000)) and the amount of IPO underpricing, after controlling for a host of 
other factors.  These results suggest that improved CMG increases pricing efficiency.  
Detailed analysis indicates that the pricing efficiency results are driven primarily by the 
insider trading and short selling variables, with earnings opacity playing a lesser role. 
 
Overall, our findings support the view that improved capital market governance is 
associated with lower costs-of-equity capital, increased market liquidity, improved price 
efficiency, and increased stock ownership by U.S. investors.  We find little evidence that 
the improvements in each of the three market performance attributes come at the expense 
of the other two.  To the extent that market regulators find the directional changes we 
document desirable, the prescriptive implications are unambiguous. 
 
2. Capital Market Governance and Equity Market Characteristics 
Capital market governance refers to the set of laws, rules, and regulations that govern the 
functioning of capital markets.  More importantly, it is the degree of enforcement of those 
laws, rules and regulations.   
 
The capital market governance measures we construct are aimed at capturing different 
facets of the interaction between insiders and outsiders of the corporations.  Corporate 
insiders have an informational advantage that they can potentially exploit to the harm of 
ordinary investors.  A key prediction from the agency theory literature is that in 
equilibrium, outsiders will factor in these agency problems and make the insiders bear the 
cost.  We posit that these costs will translate into higher costs of equity, as well as 
possibly lower market liquidity, and lower pricing efficiency. 
 
Each of our capital market governance measures is designed to track a distinct aspect of 
regulatory protection of investors from insider activities.  Insider trading laws and their 
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enforcement is the most direct expression of this type of protection.  Similarly, our 
measure of accounting opacity captures the extent to which insiders might secure an 
unfair informational advantage over outsiders.  Finally, short selling prohibitions increase 
the risk to outsiders, because they allow corporate values to be potentially overvalued, 
thus further increasing informational asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.   
 
2.1 Insider trading enforcement 
The first capital market governance measure we use is the enforcement of insider trading 
laws.  Scores of law, economics and finance papers have argued the pros and cons of 
insider trading regulations.  Bainbridge (1998), besides providing a comprehensive list of 
papers that have discussed insider trading, succinctly summarizes the arguments for and 
against allowing insider trading.  Briefly stated, in stock markets where insiders trade 
with impunity, liquidity providers would protect themselves by increasing their ask price 
and decreasing their bid price.  This increases transaction costs, leading to lower market 
liquidity, and a higher required rate of return on equity.  These transaction costs are not 
diversified away in equilibrium even in well-integrated global markets (see Lombardo 
and Pagano (2000) and Lee and Ng (2004)). 
 
A second reason the cost of equity might be higher in markets with weak insider trading 
laws is that in such markets, large controlling shareholders are more easily tempted by 
management to profit from stock tips, rather than from effort-intensive monitoring.  
Knowing this, ordinary shareholders would again demand a higher return on equity.  In 
short, the first reason predicts a higher cost of equity because of an implicit transaction 
tax inherent in high bid-ask spreads, while the second reason does not depend on an 
illiquidity premium argument.3   
 
The directional effect of insider trading enforcement on market efficiency is less clear. 
Restricting insider trading may decrease information flow and decrease the ability of 
markets to price assets quickly and efficiently.  On the other hand, when insider trading 
                                                          
3 An argument can also be made that the cost of equity is lower in markets where insiders trade freely (e.g., 
Manne (1966)).  However, the weight of the evidence appears to suggest otherwise (e.g., Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002)).    
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enforcement is more effective, analysts and other investors have greater incentives to 
analyze firms, which might lead to better market efficiency.   
 
Our measure of insider trading is based on enforcement of insider trading laws from 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002).   Bhattacharya, et al. (2000) had shown that it is the 
enforcement rather than the existence of insider trading laws that deter insiders.  In our 
empirical setup, the insider trading variable is assigned a value of 10 if there had been 
any enforcement, and zero otherwise. 
 
2.2 Earnings Opacity 
The second measure of governance we use is earnings opacity.   Our earnings opacity 
measure is based on the methodology in Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (BDW; 2003).  
Briefly, we define earnings opacity as the extent to which the distribution of reported 
earnings of firms in that country fails to provide information about the distribution of the 
true, but unobservable, economic earnings (see Appendix A for details).   
 
In their call for more research on the relation between accounting information and 
governance, Bushman and Smith (2001) identify three channels by which earnings 
opacity may affect financial markets.  First, better accounting information helps investors 
distinguish between good and bad investments, thus lowering estimation risk and leading 
to lower costs of equity and higher pricing efficiency.  Second, better accounting 
information helps investors distinguish between good and bad managers, thus decreasing 
agency costs, and lowering firms’ cost of equity.   
 
Third, earnings opacity, by weakening the link between reported earnings and 
unobservable economic earnings, increases asymmetric information.  An increase in 
asymmetric information leads to an increase in the adverse selection problem a liquidity 
provider faces when trading with insiders.  Liquidity providers in such a market would 
seek to protect themselves by increasing their ask price and decreasing their bid price.  
The increased transaction costs in turn result in higher required rates of return on equity, 
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and lower market liquidity (see Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), Jacoby, et al. (2000), and Brennan and Subramanyam (1996)). 
 
Following BDW (2003), we infer a country’s general level of earnings opacity from the 
distributional properties of its reported earnings.  Specifically, our opacity measure is 
designed to capture three aspects of reported earnings: earnings aggressiveness, loss 
avoidance, and earnings smoothing (see appendix A).  We construct a panel data set for 
each of these three measures and then average them to obtain an overall earnings opacity 
time-series measure per country.  This variable ranges from zero (most opaque) to ten 
(least opaque).   
 
2.3 Short selling constraints 
Although the directional effect of short-selling constraints on market valuation is less 
clear, the preponderance of the theoretical and empirical evidence seems to suggest that 
increased short selling constraints is associated with less efficient price discovery, lower 
market liquidity, and higher costs of capital.   
 
The earliest theoretical work on this topic is Miller (1977).  Under heterogeneous 
expectations, when short-selling constraints are binding, Miller showed that stock prices 
will be overvalued because they reflect only the bullish views.  Also, short selling 
constraints impedes price discovery and potentially lowers market liquidity.   
 
Short selling constraints can also affect the cost of equity through its potential effect on 
return skewness and volatility. Theoretical models suggest short-selling restrictions will 
give rise to greater negative skewness in returns.  To the extent that investors are averse 
to negative skewness, they will demand a higher rate of return.  At the same time, 
increased short-selling constraints are associated with higher return volatility.  Higher 
return volatility could increase cost of equity if international markets are not fully 
integrated.  Empirically, Charoenrook and Daouk (2003) provide evidence that short-
selling restrictions are indeed associated with lower market liquidity.  In addition, Bris, 
Goetzmann and Zhu (2004) find that short-selling restriction in a country tends to be 
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associated with lower pricing efficiency.  In sum, the weight of the evidence suggests that 
increased short selling constraints will adversely affect market liquidity and pricing 
efficiency, and result in higher costs of capital.  Thus, we construct our CMG index such 
that decreases in short-selling constraints are reflected as improvements in the index. 
 
Our measure of short selling restrictions is based on a survey of exchange officials by 
Charoenrook and Daouk (2003). They ask in their survey the first date where short 
selling became feasible.  Also, they ask about the existence of put options on stocks, 
because equity put options offer an alternative method to implement a short position.  In 
our empirical tests, the insider trading variable is zero if short selling was not allowed and 
put options do not exist in a given time period, and 10 if short selling is allowed or put 
options exist. 
  
After we compute the measures of insider trading, earning opacity, and short selling 
restrictions, we compute the simple average of the three measures to form the CMG 
index.  This measure ranges from 0 (worst governance) to 10 (best governance). 
 
2.4 Relation to Other Studies 
Some other studies conduct in-depth case study on the issue of governance in a particular 
market.  For example, Black, Jang and Kim (2005) conduct an in-depth country case 
study of the factors that predict governance levels for both large and small Korean firms. 
On the other hand, our study is in a stream of literature that adopts a multi-country 
approach.  At least two recent studies have also focused on the relation between market-
based regulations and equity markets.  In this section, we discuss the distinctive features 
of our study relative to other concurrent projects.  
 
La Porta et al. (2002) conducts a detailed analysis of how securities laws affect the issue 
of new equity to the public.  Their focus is on the agency problem between prospective 
investors in an initial public offering (IPO) and the “promoter” who offers shares for sale.  
Their data allows them to evaluate the efficacy of specific types of securities laws, but 
their focus is primarily on laws governing the IPO process.  Using the disclosure 
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requirement and enforcement indices developed by La Porta et al. (2002), Hail and Leuz 
(2003) examine the effect of securities regulation and legal institutions on firms’ implied 
cost of capital.  Both studies conclude that more extensive securities regulation yield 
beneficial results for security markets, such as lower levels of cost of capital.   
 
Our study is similar in spirit to these two papers.  However, we use a unique set of capital 
market governance metrics and examine a much wider range of market performance 
metrics.  Our earnings opacity measure captures three different dimensions of a country’s 
accounting system, and allows these dimensions to vary over time.  Similarly our insider-
law and short-selling restriction measures identify not only countries with superior laws, 
but also the timing of the enforcement of these laws.  These research design innovations 
allow us to examine the effect of changes in governance not only on the implied cost of 
capital, but also the average realized returns.   
 
In addition, our study allows us to evaluate the effect of capital market governance on 
multiple dimensions of market performance.  Market regulators are understandably 
concerned about the effect of securities laws on many different aspects of performance.  
For example, regulations that lower the cost of capital might have adverse effects on 
market liquidity or pricing efficiency.  To our knowledge, we are the first study to 
examine how securities laws affect a wide range of market performance metrics.   Our 
approach allows regulators to evaluate potential trade-offs in performance within a 
consistent research framework. 
 
3. Market Performance Measures 
As Figure 2 shows, the dependent variables for our analysis can be broadly categorized 
into three groups: (1) two measures of the cost of equity, (2) market liquidity (including 
trading volume, market depth, and foreign U.S. investments), and (3) pricing efficiency 
(including price synchronicity and IPO underpricing).  In this section, we discuss each of 
these measures in detail.    
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3.1 Cost of equity measures 
The cost of equity in a country is defined as the return shareholders require for holding 
shares in that country.  This is an expectations variable, which must be proxied for using 
observable data.  We employ two approaches: a price implied cost-of-capital, and average 
realized returns. 
 
3.1.1 The Implied Approach 
The first approach is to compute the cost of equity by backing it out from the classical 
constant growth dividend discount model.  Appendix A in Bekaert and Harvey (2000) 
explores in great detail the relation between dividend yields and the cost of equity for 
many models.  Assuming that the best forecast for future growth rates in dividends is the 
most current dividend growth rate, which implies that we assume that dividend growth 
rates follow a random walk, it follows that the estimated cost of equity  =  current 
dividend yield × (1 + current growth rate of dividends) + current growth rate of 
dividends. 
 
We use dividend yields to measure cost of equity because these yields are observable, 
stable, and stationary.  In general, a sharp change in cost of equity should lead to a sharp 
change in dividend yields.  A disadvantage of using dividend yields is that changes in 
dividend yields may come about because of repurchases of stock.  However, this problem 
should be small in emerging markets because repurchases are minor.4 
 
3.1.2 The International Asset Pricing Approach 
The second approach to estimating the cost of equity using realized returns while 
explicitly accounting for risk. We adopt a simplified version of Bekaert and Harvey 
(1995) as our international asset pricing model.  Their empirical specification allows for 
partial integration of a country to the world equity markets. Their model is appealing 
because it permits a country to evolve from a developing segmented market (where risk is 
measured by the country’s variance) to a developed country which is integrated to world 
                                                          
4 Another approach to estimating the implied cost-of-capital is to incorporate analyst forecasts of earnings 
(e.g., Lee, Ng, and Swaminathan (2003) and Hail and Leuz (2003)).  While the use of forecasted earnings 
might lead to increased precision, our technique does not require firms to have analyst coverage.  Because 
our analysis is at the country-level (i.e. not firm level), these techniques are likely to yield similar results.  
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equity markets (where risk is measured by the sensitivity of a country’s equity returns to 
movements in the world market portfolio).  The special case of complete integration, 
where the world factor is the only factor, is nested in their model.  We describe the details 
of this asset pricing model, and our estimation procedure in Appendix B.   
 
3.2 Market Liquidity Measures 
We are also interested in how CMG affects market liquidity.  A simple measure of 
market liquidity is trading volume.  However, volume alone does not fully capture the 
concept we have in mind, particularly if increased volume comes at the expense of 
increased volatility.  We therefore use several different measures, including market depth 
(volume divided by volatility) and the amount of U.S. foreign investment. 
 
3.2.1 Trading Volume  
We use the rate of turnover in a market to measure trading volume.  Specifically, our 
volume measure is defined as the ratio of volume of dollar trade per month to the dollar 
market capitalization at the end of the month.  To mitigate the effect of outliers, which 
occur because the denominator is small in some countries, we take the natural logarithm 
of this ratio.   
 
3.2.2 Market Depth 
While trading volume is the lifeblood of markets, it is not necessarily the best measure of 
market quality.  This is because, from an investor's perspective, increased volume does 
not necessarily translate into increased market liquidity.  The notion of market liquidity is 
related to how much trading can be done without adversely affecting prices (i.e. how 
much trading can be accomplished with minimal price impact).  Unfortunately, increased 
volume is generally accompanied by increased volatility, so higher trading volume alone 
is insufficient evidence that market depth has increased.  
 
A better measure of market depth, or liquidity, is volume turnover scaled by return 
volatility (e.g., Amihud (2002)).  This variable captures the quantity of trading per unit of 
volatility, and is closer to the notion of market quality investors are most concerned 
about.  Moreover, Hasbrouck (2003) finds that the Amihud (2002) variable is the best 
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among the non-intraday measures of price impact costs. We construct two versions of the 
market depth variable.  In the first, we use the ratio of trading volume (see section 3.2.1 
above) to the standard deviation of daily returns computed each month.  In the second, 
we use the ratio of trading volume to the absolute value of the monthly returns.5 
 
 
3.2.3 U.S. foreign stockholdings 
A liquid market is also characterized by a breadth of ownership, in particular by foreign 
investors.  We construct a measure that examines US citizens’ stockholding in a country 
relative to what the US holdings would have been based on the country’s market 
capitalization.  If an investor wishes to be fully diversified across different countries, 
(s)he should hold a portfolio of country indices whose weights are in proportion to the 
market capitalization of those countries.  In reality, the actual holdings of US investors 
can differ sharply from these theoretic weights. 
 
We compute a measure that captures this difference.  Specifically, we use the ratio of the 
percentage of US stockholdings in each country to the percentage of the market 
capitalization of the country.  To mitigate the effect of outliers, we take the natural 
logarithm of this ratio.  In other words, we use: 
 
1
1
/
_ ln
/
N
i j
j
i N
i j
j
h h
US hold
cap cap
=
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
 
 
where ih  is US stockholding in dollars in country i and icap  is market capitalization of 
country i in dollars where N is the number of countries in the world.   
 
This variable captures the over (under) weighting in shareholdings by U.S. investors for 
each country, relative to that country’s weight in a global index.  We conjecture that U.S. 
investors (who are not constrained to buy stocks from any countries) are less inclined to 
                                                          
5  We also used the conditional volatility of monthly returns computed from the multivariate ARCH model 
used in the International Asset Pricing Model described above. The results are similar and are not reported. 
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hold stocks in markets with lower CMG scores. 
 
In constructing this variable, we use data on foreign stockholdings by US citizens from 
Bhattacharya and Groznik (2003).  The data is based on a survey carried out by the U.S. 
Treasury Department and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (also 
see Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2001)).  Market capitalization in dollars is from 
Datastream. 
 
 
3.3 Pricing Efficiency Measures 
In addition to the cost-of-capital and market liquidity, market regulators are also 
interested in the effect of security laws on markets’ ability to efficiently price stocks and 
process new information.  We use two empirical proxies suggested by the ex ante 
literature. 
 
3.3.1 Price Synchronicity 
In an interesting study, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) argue that in more price efficient 
markets, stocks will exhibit higher average idiosyncratic risk.  According to this 
argument, the ratio of firm-specific information to market-level information should be 
higher in informational environments that allow market participants to acquire 
information, and act quickly and inexpensively upon it.  Therefore, Morck et al. (2000) 
nominate stock synchronicity as a measure of the overall price efficiency of the market.   
 
Following their definition, we compute this variable as the average R2 from firm-level 
regressions of bi-weekly stock returns on local and U.S. market indices in each country.  
Countries with higher average R2 (higher price synchronicity) are deemed to be less price 
efficient.  Given our overall research design, we examine how the CMG variables, both 
collectively and individually, affect a country’s price synchronicity.   
 
3.3.2 IPO Underpricing 
IPO underpricing refers to the frequent incidence of large initial returns accruing to 
investors in IPOs of common stock.  We use average IPO first-day returns from Professor 
Jay Ritter’s web site (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/) for 38 countries.  The range in 
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average first-day returns vary greatly, from China at 257% to Denmark at only 5%. The 
prior research has linked IPO underpricing to various agency problems including 
information asymmetry and corruption (see Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) and 
Ritter and Welch (2002) for a summary of this literature).  Generally, greater 
underpricing is associated with high pricing inefficiencies.  To the extent improved 
governance will reduce these types of agency problems, we expect an increased CMG to 
reduce IPO underpricing. 
 
Note that although we treat IPO underpricing as a price discovery problem, it can also be 
regarded as part of the cost of capital analysis.  IPO is a way for entrepreneurs to raise 
capital for their enterprise.  The larger the underpricing, the less money the entrepreneur 
receives for selling claims to outside investors.  This is equivalent to an increased cost of 
raising capital for existing shareholders.  
 
 
4. Data Description and Sample Selection 
Data on monthly equity indices of 22 developed countries were obtained from Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI).  Data on monthly equity indices of 10 emerging 
markets were obtained from International Financial Corporation (IFC). The data are from 
December 1969 to December 1998 (some countries do not have data for the full time 
period).  
 
We use the MSCI value-weighted World Index as a proxy for the world market portfolio.  
Monthly returns of each country’s stock market and the world market portfolio are 
computed from these indices.  We obtain monthly data on dividend yields for the 32 
countries based on Datastream indices.  We obtain monthly data on the volume of trade 
and market capitalization from Datastream (this data was available for 29 of the 32 
countries in our sample). 
 
Bekaert and Harvey (1997) divide the sum of exports and imports by the country’s gross 
domestic product to obtain a variable that captures the level of integration of a country 
with the rest of the world.  This is because the level of globalization affects the cost of 
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equity (see Stulz (1999a)).  We follow the same procedure.  Monthly data on exports and 
imports for the 32 countries were obtained from the International Financial Statistics 
provided by the International Monetary Fund.  
 
As purchasing power parity is not observed in the data, standard international asset 
pricing models like Ferson and Harvey (1993) and Dumas and Solnik (1995) have a 
foreign exchange factor (FX factor). We include this control in our international asset 
pricing factor model as well.  Monthly data on foreign exchange rates are obtained from 
the International Financial Statistics. 
 
We also control for the confounding effect of market liberalization.  When a country 
opens its capital markets to foreigners, its cost of equity is expected to be reduced 
through improved risk-sharing and better corporate governance (Stulz (1999b)).  Bekaert 
and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000) empirically confirm that market liberalization 
activities do reduce a country’s cost of equity.  To control for this phenomenon, we use 
official liberalization dates from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). 
 
Finally, we use several variables as controls for the level of corporate governance and 
protection of minority shareholder rights in different countries. Klapper and Love (2004) 
showed that better corporate governance is highly correlated with better performance in 
many emerging markets. Following La Porta et al. (1998), we use a measure of the 
efficacy of the judicial system (Judsys), ranging from 0 (least efficient) to 10 (most 
efficient).  Antidir is an aggregate index developed by La Porta et al. (1998) to capture 
shareholder rights within a country.  Acctstand is a crude measure of the quality of 
financial reporting in a country, based on the inclusion or omission of 90 items in seven 
categories.  We also use binary variables that represent the legal origin of the different 
countries (English, French, German and Scandinavian legal regime).   
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5. Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table I presents the countries in our dataset in alphabetical order.  Each country is 
associated with values of the components of the CMG index. The values associated with 
“Short Selling” and “Put Options” represent the date each was first feasible in a given 
country.  The “Insider Trading Enforcement” column reports the date of the first 
enforcement action against an insider for trading violations. Also, table I shows for each 
country, average liquidity, depth, efficiency and cost of equity measures.   
 
<Insert Table I here> 
 
The “Earnings Opacity” score is the average of three earnings opacity decile rankings.  
To construct this number, we rank each country-month into deciles on each of three 
opacity measures (earning aggressiveness, loss aversion, and income smoothing).  We 
then take the average of these three rankings in computing an opacity index.  Table 
values represent the monthly average index value for each country.  Higher scores 
indicate lower opacity (i.e. greater transparency).   
 
Table II ranks countries by the quality of each component of the CMG index, in 
descending order.  In constructing the short-selling ranking, we took the earlier of either 
the date of the relaxation of short-selling constraints, or the date that put options are 
allowed into a market.  Also reported in this table is the rank of each country according to 
the CMG index itself. As can be seen, the top five countries in terms of quality of capital 
market governance are United States, Brazil, Canada, France, and the U. K., respectively.  
The bottom three countries are India, Greece, and Pakistan, respectively.  Most of the 
countries that score high on the CMG index are European or American countries.  
However, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan, also count among the top ten.  Having the 
largest market capitalization in Latin America, Brazil also enjoys a high CMG score due 
 18
to its long-standing insider trading law enforcement, feasibility of short selling and 
relatively good earning opacity score.   
 
<Insert Table II here> 
 
5.2 Does capital market governance affect stock markets? 
Our main empirical tests explore the effect of capital market governance on several 
dimensions of market performance – the cost of capital, market liquidity, and pricing 
efficiency.  This section reports our results. 
 
As a preliminary exploration, we plot the time series of CMG, liquidity, and cost of 
equity measures averaged over all countries. This is shown in figure 3. We normalize all 
three time series to have a value of one in 1992. This is arbitrary. However, it allows us 
to have all three series with the same scale. As can be seen, CMG and liquidity seem to 
exhibit an upward trend. On the other hand, cost of equity seems to show a downward 
trend. This is an early indication that CMG has improved over the years, potentially 
increasing liquidity and reducing cost of equity. 
 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
 
5.2.1 Cost of equity 
We first explore the effect of capital market governance on the cost of equity.  Using the 
dividend yield-based measure of cost of equity as the dependent variable, we run five 
panel time-series regressions with country-fixed effects. Model 1 uses CMG as the 
independent variable.  Models 2 to 4 use each one component of CMG as the independent 
variable.  Model 5 uses all three components of CMG as the independent variables.  All 
models control for liberalization, liquidity risk (Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996))6, 
and foreign exchange risk (Ferson and Harvey (1993), Dumas and Solnik (1995))7. The 
                                                          
6  The proxy for liquidity risk is turnover. Turnover is the ratio of volume of trade to market capitalization. 
We take the natural logarithm of this ratio for reasons mentioned before. 
7 Because of convergence problems, our estimation is a two-step procedure. In the first step we strip out the 
effects of the local variance factor and the world factor, and in the second step, to isolate the effect of 
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panel regressions use data for the 32 countries for which we have dividend yield data 
from January 1986 to December 1998 (some countries do not have data for the full time 
period). We correct for country-specific heteroskedasticity and country-specific 
autocorrelation. 
 
Table III presents the results from these panel time-series regressions. In model 1, the 
coefficient for the CMG variable is negative and statistically significant at the one 
percent level. This is consistent with our hypothesis that improved capital market 
governance lowers the cost of equity. The association is also economically significant. 
An increase in CMG of one standard deviation is associated with a 2.6 percent decrease 
in the cost of equity.8  The coefficient on the currency risk has the right sign, but is not 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels. The liberalization indicator has 
the correct negative sign, but is not significantly different from zero at conventional 
levels. The liquidity variable has the correct negative sign, but is also not significantly 
different from zero.  The results from models 2 to 5 are broadly consistent with our 
conclusion. Each of the three components of CMG is significant and of the correct sign 
when included on its own. When all components are included together, they are still of 
the correct sign, although only earnings opacity remains significant.  
 
<Insert Table III here> 
 
We also compute a cost of capital measure based on realized returns using non-linear 
least squares.  The results are reported in Panel A of Table IV. 
 
<Insert Table IV here> 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
earnings opacity, we strip out the effects of other factors like the FX factor. The FX factor that we use is the 
conditional covariance of the return of the stock market index of the country with the return a U.S. investor 
would receive if she held the foreign currency. This conditional covariance is obtained by using the 
multivariate ARCH model we previously discussed in equation (2) – just replace the world portfolio (w) by 
the foreign exchange portfolio (ifx). 
8 Calculated as 0.0025 (per month) × 12 months × 0.86 (the time-series standard deviation of the CMG 
index, averaged across all countries) 
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Panel A of Table IV reveals that covariance risk has a positive price (λcov is positive). 
The estimates are statistically significant at the five percent level.  It also reveals that own 
country variance risk has a positive price (λvar is positive).  The estimates are statistically 
significant at the ten percent level.  Using residuals from the first stage as the dependent 
variable, we run five panel time-series regressions with country-fixed effects.  Models 1, 
2, 3, 4 and 5 are as previously defined. We control for liberalization, liquidity risk, and 
foreign exchange risk as before. 
 
Panel B of Table IV presents the results from this panel time-series regression. The 
coefficient of the CMG index (model 1) is negative and statistically significant at the one 
percent level. This is consistent with our hypothesis that capital market governance 
adversely affects the cost of equity.  An increase in CMG of one standard deviation is 
associated with a 2.9 percent decrease in the cost of equity.  At first blush, this result 
might appear surprisingly large.  However, many of the countries in our sample are 
emerging markets, with yearly returns that range from -18 percent to 28 percent.  In this 
context, our estimate of the impact of improved capital market governance on the cost of 
equity does not seem extreme.  
 
In sum, we derive the cost of equity using two sharply different methods of estimation – 
the dividend yield method (implicitly controls for risk, but has less estimation risk) and 
an international asset pricing model (explicitly controls for risk, but has more estimation 
risk).  Yet the results are strikingly similar – a one standard-deviation change in the CMG 
index is associated with a 2.6 percent and 2.9 percent change in the cost of capital, 
respectively.  These results suggest our finding is robust to perturbations in the method 
for estimating the cost of capital. 
 
5.2.3 Liquidity (Trading Volume, Market depth, and US foreign holdings) 
Our first measure of market liquidity is trading volume (or turnover), defined as the ratio 
of the dollar volume of trade to the total market capitalization.9 We run five panel time-
                                                          
9 We also use natural log of the ratio as the dependent variable and the results remain the same. 
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series regressions with country-fixed effects in table V.  The second measure of liquidity 
is market depth (Turnover/Volatility), and these regressions are reported in table VI.   
 
Table V presents the results from this panel time-series regression. The coefficient of the 
CMG index is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. An increase in 
CMG of one standard deviation is associated with a 9.5 percent increase in trading 
volume (i.e. the turnover ratio).10  The results from models 2 to 5 are generally consistent 
with our conclusion. The coefficients on liberalization are significant, and have the right 
sign. 
<Insert Table V about here> 
 
One concern with the trading volume result is that improved CMG could lead to greater 
volatility.  In terms of overall market liquidity, we are interested in measuring how much 
volume can be traded without excessive price movements.  The Market Depth regressions 
are aimed at this issue.  Specifically, these variables evaluate the extent to which CMG 
allows a greater volume to be traded per unit of market volatility. 
 
Table VI reports results for the Market Depth regressions.  The dependent variable in 
Model 7 is Volatility.  In Models 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 we compute market depth 
(Turnover/Volatility), with volatility defined as the standard deviation of daily returns 
computed each month.  In Model 6 we compute Market Depth using the ratio of market 
turnover to the absolute value of monthly returns.  We control for liberalization in all 
models. The panel regressions use data for the 32 countries for which we have daily 
return data. We correct for country-specific heteroskedasticity and country-specific 
autocorrelation. 
 
Table VI shows that the coefficient of the CMG index is positive and statistically 
significant at the one percent level, indicating that improvements in CMG increase 
market depth.  An increase in CMG of one standard deviation is associated with a 9.3 
                                                          
10 This is computed as 0.004 × 0.86 / 0.036 where 0.86 is average time-series standard deviation of CMG 
index, and 0.036 is the overall average of market turnover. 
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percent increase in market depth.11  The results from models 2 to 7 are also in line with 
our hypothesis.12  Model 7 indicates that improved CMG is associated with increased 
volatility.  However, the results from models 1 through 6 show that overall, improved 
CMG increases market depth – i.e., is associated with increased volume per unit of 
volatility.  In short, our evidence shows that the increase in trading volume due to better 
governance more than compensates for the increase in volatility, leading to a net 
improvement in market depth. 
 
<Insert Table VI about here> 
  
In addition to volume and depth, we also use the US holdings as an indirect measure of 
liquidity.  We use as our dependent variable log ratio of the percentage of US 
stockholdings in each country to the percentage of the market capitalization of the 
country in the global portfolio as the dependent variable.  Five cross-sectional regressions 
are conducted.13   
 
Table VII presents the results from these regressions.  In model 1, the coefficient of the 
capital market governance variable is positive and statistically significant at the one 
percent level. This is consistent with our hypothesis that our capital market governance 
measure increases the percentage of holdings by US citizens relative to the size of the 
market.  An increase in CMG of one standard deviation is associated with a 12.7 percent 
increase in the holdings ratio14.  These findings are supported in models 2 and 5.  Our 
finding is related to Giannetti and Koskinen (2004) which propose in a theoretical model 
that investors are biased towards investing in countries with good governance.  Dahlquist, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2002) find that most firms in countries with poor 
investor protection are closely held.  They argue that this finding might explain part of 
the home bias of U.S. investors.    
                                                          
11 This is calculated as 0.08 × 0.86 / 0.74 where 0.86 is average time-series standard deviation of CMG 
index, and 0.74 is the overall average of market depth. 
12 We also use the conditional volatility of monthly returns computed from the multivariate ARCH model 
used in the International Asset Pricing Model described above. The results remain the same. 
13 We also used the ratio itself without taking log.  The result remains the same. 
14 Computed as exp(0.1386 × 0.86) - 1 where 0.86 is average time-series standard deviation of CMG index. 
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<Insert Table VII here> 
 
5.2.6 Pricing Efficiency (Stock price synchronicity and IPO Underpricing) 
We have two measures of pricing efficiency, stock price synchronicity and IPO 
underpricing.  Using stock price synchronicity and IPO underpicing as the dependent 
variable, we run five cross-sectional regressions in tables VIII and IX.  All models 
control for accounting standard, anti-director rights, efficiency of the judicial system, and 
legal origin.   
 
Table VIII presents the results on stock price synchronicity.  In model 1, the coefficient 
of the capital market governance variable is negative and statistically significant at the 
one percent level.  An increase in CMG of one standard deviation is associated with a 1.9 
percent decrease in the stock price synchronicity (the R2 measure described above).  The 
results from models 2 to 5 are all in the same directions.  These findings are consistent 
with, and generalizes, Bris et al. (2004)’s finding that a relaxation of short sales 
constraints is associated with improved market pricing efficiency.   
  
<Insert Table VIII here> 
  
 
Table IX presents the results from the IPO regressions.  In model 1, the coefficient of the 
capital market governance variable is negative and statistically significant at the one 
percent level.  An increase in CMG of one standard deviation is associated with a 5.2 
percent decrease in the IPO underpricing15.  This is consistent with our hypothesis that 
our capital market governance measure improves pricing efficiency, and reduces the cost 
to firm insiders of obtaining capital via going public.  The results from models 2 to 5 are 
qualitatively similar.  
 
                                                          
15 Calculated as exp(-0.0586 × 0.86) - 1 where 0.86 is average time-series standard deviation of CMG 
index. 
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<Insert Table IX here> 
 
6. Additional Robustness Checks 
Although we have already conducted a number of robustness checks, the interpretation of 
our empirical results can still be complicated by potential correlated omitted variables 
and the endogeneity of capital market governance.  We have attempted to deal with these 
concerns through the use of country-level fixed-effect models.  In addition, we now run 
two additional robustness tests.   
 
First, we reconstruct the CMG index by incorporating an extra factor.  We use an 
aggregate country corruption index to proxy for other governance factors in that 
country’s legal environment.  This corruption index published by International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) is more general in scope, and is intended to capture governance 
effects that are not included in our previous measures (see Lee and Ng (2004)).   We 
reran all the regressions in the paper and find that all the results are robust to the 
inclusion of this measure. 
 
Second, we estimated a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model proposed by Sims (1980).  
In this model, we treat capital market governance, the cost of equity, and market depth as 
endogenously determined dependent variables.  These three endogenous variables are 
modeled as linear functions of lagged endogenous variables and all exogenous variables 
in the system.  The system of equations in the VAR is estimated jointly.  This means that 
the effect of the independent variables on each endogenous variable takes into account 
the endogenous nature of the other endogenous variables. 
  
Formally, the system of equations to estimate the effect on the cost of equity is: 
titiitiitiitiiit utionLiberalizaLiquidityForexCMGequityoft ,1,141,13,121,1110__cos +++++= −− ββββα
and 
titiitiitiiititi utionLiberalizaLiquidityForexequityoftCMG ,2,241,23,2212120, __cos +++++= −− ββββα
 
The system of equations on market depth (Liquidity) is: 
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titiitiiit utionLiberalizaCMGLiquidity ,1,121,1110 +++= − ββα  
and 
titiitiiit utionLiberalizaLiquidityCMG ,2,221,2120 +++= − ββα  
 
The system of equations is estimated jointly using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
(SUR).  SUR computes estimates using the technique of joint GLS (Generalized Least 
Squares).  The two error terms u1i,t and u2i,t are allowed to be correlated (see Enders 
(1996) for further details).  The estimation allows for country fixed-effects, for country-
specific heteroskedasticity, and for country-specific autocorrelation.  
 
We find that endogeneity does exist.  Overall capital market governance is negatively 
affected by the cost of equity using the dividend yield method.  Also, governance is 
affected by liquidity.  However, despite the endogeneity that we explicitly account for, 
our previous inferences on the effect of capital market governance variables on the cost 
of equity or trading volume are not affected.16 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper explores the link between capital market governance (CMG) and market 
performance in a broad cross-section of countries.  We use variables related to three 
dimensions of capital market governance – earning opacity, enforcement of insider 
trading laws, and short-selling.  We combine these three dimensions to obtain an overall 
capital market governance time-series measure per country.  We then examine the 
association between changes in CMG and changes in: (1) the cost of capital (both 
realized and implied); (2) market liquidity (i.e., trading volume and market depth) , and 
U.S. foreign stockownership); and (3) pricing efficiency (i.e., stock price synchronicity 
and IPO underpricing).  
 
We document in our tests that, after controlling for other influences, an increase in 
overall capital market governance in a country is linked to a decrease in the cost of 
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equity, an increase in market liquidity, and an increase in pricing efficiency.  Specifically, 
improved security laws are associated with decreased cost of capital, higher trading 
volume, greater market depth, increased U.S. ownership, lower price synchronicity, and 
reduced IPO underpricing.  These results hold for the overall CMG index, and are 
directionally consistent for each of the three individual CMG components.   
 
We believe our analyses have important implications for investors, securities regulators 
and financial academics.  Collectively, our evidence points to the importance of security 
laws to the proper functioning of stock markets.  Specifically, our results indicate that 
increased enforcement of insider trading laws, improved accounting standards (through 
more stringent auditing and disclosure standards) and a relaxation of short selling 
constraints are all associated with market performance.  Specifically, improvements in 
these CMG variables lead to decreases in the cost of capital, increases in market liquidity, 
and increases in market pricing efficiency.  In general, the magnitude of these relations 
suggests they are economically and statistically important.  
 
These findings are consistent with the view that investors associate bad capital market 
governance with increased risk.  Specifically, our findings suggest heightened investor 
concerns over capital market governance can prompt investors to reduce their trading 
activity and demand greater premiums for holding equity securities.  Interestingly, we 
also find that bad security laws result in lower market pricing efficiency.  To the extent 
that regulators prefer lower costs of capital, greater market liquidity, and improved 
pricing efficiency, the prescriptive implications of our results are unambiguous. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 We use the implied cost of capital for this test.  Because of the two-stage nature of the estimation of the 
cost of capital using the international asset pricing model method, it was not possible for us to run a VAR 
for this method. 
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Appendix A: Description of Earnings Opacity Measures 
 
Earnings opacity is inherently difficult to measure, particularly across countries, because 
it is not possible to pinpoint management’s motives, and it is difficult to compare 
accounting standards and the enforcement of these accounting standards.  In addition, it is 
not possible to capture all factors that might influence earnings opacity, or to model how 
they interact to produce more or less opaque earnings.  Therefore, rather than studying 
the inputs that determine earnings opacity, Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (BDW; 
2003) analyze the outcome: the distributional properties of reported accounting numbers 
across countries and across time that suggest earnings opacity.  We adapt the BDW 
approach in this study, and explain our estimation process in detail below. 
 
We use measures that are intended to capture three attributes of earnings numbers that 
could lead to earnings opacity: earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and earnings 
smoothing.  We focus on these three dimensions because prior literature has suggested 
that these three dimensions may weaken the link between accounting performance and 
the true economic performance of a firm.  We limit our analysis of earnings opacity to 
industrial firms, so that differences in the underlying earnings process across different 
industry groups, and differences in the proportion of firms in various industry groups 
across countries and across time, do not affect the dimensions of reported earnings we 
examine.   
 
Finally, given the above mentioned difficulties in measuring earnings opacity, all our 
tests are inherently joint tests of two hypotheses: one, our three measures, or a composite 
of all three, are associated with uninformative or opaque earnings and, two, earnings 
opacity creates an informational risk that affects the cost of equity and liquidity.  We 
construct a panel data set for each of these three measures of the three dimensions of 
earnings opacity – earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and earnings smoothing – 
and then combine them to obtain an overall earnings opacity time-series measure per 
country. 
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A.1 Earnings aggressiveness measure 
Our first measure of earnings opacity is earnings aggressiveness.  Ball, Kothari and 
Robin (2000) argue that the opposite of aggressiveness, accounting conservatism, which 
is the more timely incorporation of economic losses versus economic gains into 
accounting earnings, arises to reduce information asymmetry.  Specifically, they argue 
that three factors are expected to lead to accounting conservatism.  First, accountants are 
aware that managers would like to report economic gains and suppress information about 
economic losses.  Hence, accountants find negative information more credible, and are 
more likely to incorporate it into accounting income.  Second, lenders are important users 
of financial statements, and lenders are more impacted by economic losses than by 
economic gains.  Third, the timely incorporation of economic losses provides an 
important corporate governance role, providing quick feedback about bad investment 
decisions and strategies that managers may not wish to disclose.  The first and third of 
these factors suggest that accounting conservatism is related to informativeness, since 
conservative accounting is expected to provide information that management may have 
incentives to withhold otherwise17. 
 
We follow Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Ahmed et al. (2002) and use accruals to measure 
earnings aggressiveness.  As earnings aggressiveness is the tendency to delay the 
recognition of losses and speed the recognition of gains, it implies that, if cash flow 
realizations are held equal, we would expect accruals to increase as earnings 
aggressiveness increases.  Aggressive accounting would be characterized by fewer such 
negative accruals which capture economic losses, and more positive accruals which 
capture economic gains, increasing the overall level of accruals.  Although unrealized 
gains and unrealized losses will eventually be recognized in accounting earnings in any 
clean surplus accounting system, a more conservative accounting system is expected to 
                                                          
17 It is possible that earnings aggressiveness does not necessarily lead to earnings opacity.  It could be 
argued that conservative accounting prevents good news from being transmitted quickly, thus adding noise.  
However, given that one might reasonably expect managerial incentives to overstate rather than understate 
earnings on average, our belief is that aggressive earnings are more opaque earnings, because such 
accounting reports are more likely to reflect biased and optimistic reporting on the part of management, 
adding noise to reported earnings and, hence, increasing earnings opacity.  To understand these managerial 
motives, see, for example, Rangan (1998), Teoh et al. (1998), Shivakumar (2000), Healy  (1985), Barth et 
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result in more negative accruals at any given point in time.  This result arises because a 
greater proportion of economic losses relative to economic gains will be reflected in 
accounting earnings at any point in time.   
 
This observation provides the impetus for us to measure the earnings aggressiveness of a 
country at a point in time as the median for country i, year t, of accruals divided by 
lagged total assets.  We use the median observation of scaled accruals to minimize the 
influence of extreme observations.  The higher is the median observation of scaled 
accruals of country i in year t, the higher is the earnings aggressiveness. 
 
Consistent with much of the past literature (e.g., Healy (1985), Jones (1991), Dechow et 
al.  (1995),  Leuz et al. (2002)), we compute scaled accruals from balance sheet and 
income statement information, and then compute scaled cash flows as scaled operating 
income minus scaled accruals.  We do not use information from the cash flow statement 
because of differences in the presentation of cash flow information across countries and 
time.  In fact, many of our sample countries do not require the preparation or presentation 
of a statement of cash flows.  We define scaled accruals as 
 
 ACC kt = ( CA kt –  CL kt -  CASH kt +  STD kt - DEP kt +  TP kt) /  TA kt-1  (A1) 
 
where 
 
ACC kt   = Scaled accruals for firm k, year t 
 CA kt    = Change in total current assets for firm k, year t 
 CL kt   = Change in total current liabilities for firm k, year t  
 CASH kt   = Change in cash for firm k, year t 
STD kt    = Change in current portion of long-term debt included in total 
current liabilities 
     for firm k, year t 
                                                                                                                                                                             
al. (1999).  Ultimately, whether earnings aggressiveness leads to earnings opacity or not is an empirical 
issue. 
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DEP kt   = Depreciation and amortization expense for firm k, year t 
 TP kt  = Change in income taxes payable for firm k, year t 
TA kt-1    = Total assets for firm k, year t-1. 
 
A.2 Loss avoidance measure 
Our second measure of earnings opacity is loss avoidance behavior.  Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) present persuasive evidence that U.S. firms engage in earnings 
management to avoid reporting negative earnings.  DeGeorge et al. (1999) provide 
evidence that suggests that the following hierarchy exists among three earnings 
thresholds: 1) avoiding negative earnings, 2) reporting increases in quarterly earnings, 
and 3) meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts.  As Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and 
DeGeorge et al. (1999) discuss, these results indicate that incentives to report positive 
earnings (i.e., beat a benchmark of zero earnings) exist for some sample firms.  Such loss 
avoidance behavior obscures the relationship between earnings and economic 
performance, thus increasing earnings opacity. 
 
We define firms with small positive earnings (small negative earnings) as firms with net 
income scaled by lagged total assets between 0 and 1% (between 0 and -1%).  We find 
the ratio of the number of firms with small positive earnings minus the number of firms 
with small negative earnings divided by their sum.  The higher is this ratio in country i, 
year t, the higher is the loss avoidance. 
 
A.3 Earnings smoothing measure 
Our third measure of earnings opacity is earnings smoothing.  Some accounting standards 
(for example, cases of high book/tax conformity) or some managerial motives may lead 
to smooth earnings over time.  If accounting earnings are artificially smooth, they fail to 
depict the true swings in underlying firm performance, thus decreasing the 
informativeness of reported earnings and, hence, increasing earnings opacity.  This is 
consistent with the view of earnings smoothing taken in Leuz et al. (2002).  An 
alternative view, is that earnings smoothing can be used by management as a means to 
convey information, potentially decreasing earnings opacity.  While we believe that 
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earnings smoothing at the country level is indicative of accounting that obscures 
information about economic volatility, whether or not earnings smoothing leads to 
earnings opacity and adverse capital market consequences is again an empirical issue. 
 
Following Leuz et al. (2002), we find the cross-sectional correlation between the change 
in accruals and the change in cash flows, both scaled by lagged total assets, in country i, 
year t.  Cash flows are obtained by subtracting accruals (which were obtained in (A1)) 
from operating earnings.  Because some degree of earnings smoothing is a natural 
outcome of any accrual accounting process, this measure is expected to be negative on 
average.  However, the more negative this correlation, the more likely it is that earnings 
smoothing is obscuring the variability in underlying economic performance, and the 
greater is the earnings opacity. 
 
A.4 Combining the Measures 
We construct a panel data set for each of these three measures of the three dimensions of 
earnings opacity, and combine them to create an aggregate Earnings Opacity score.  
Specifically, we rank each country-month into deciles for each measure, and take the 
average of these three rankings for each country-month to create the index.  The 
descriptive statistic reported in Table 1 is the average score across all available months 
for each country.  
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Appendix B: International Asset Pricing Model 
 
In computing the cost of capital using average realized returns, we adopt a simplified 
version of the international asset pricing model in Bekaert and Harvey (1995).  This 
appendix describes the model and our estimation procedure. 
 
The basic model we use is expressed as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) titititwititfti ehhrr ,,var,,,cov,0,, 1 +−++=− λφλφα    (B1) 
 
where 
 
ri, t is the dollar monthly return of the stock market index of country i at time t, 
rf, t is the monthly return of the one month U.S. T-Bill at time t, 
α0 is a constant that would be estimated, 
φi , t  is a measure of the level of integration of country i at time t, 0 < φi , t  < 1, 
λcov is the price of the covariance risk that would be estimated, 
hi,w, t is the conditional covariance of the monthly return of the stock market 
index of country i with the monthly return of the world index at time t, 
λvar is the price of own country variance risk that would be estimated (which we 
are restricting to be the same across all countries), 
hi ,t is the conditional variance of the monthly return of the stock market index 
of country i at time t, and 
ei,t is the residual error term. 
 
The independent variables in model (B1) – conditional covariance hi,w, t and conditional 
variance hi,t  – are separately estimated pair-wise for each country i and world pair from 
the multivariate ARCH model specified below: 
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where 
 
rw, t is the dollar monthly return of the stock market index of the world at time t, 
εi, t-j is the innovation in monthly return of the stock market index of country i at time 
t-j, j  {0,1,2,3}, 
εw, t-j is the innovation in monthly return of the stock market index of the world at 
time t-j, j  {0,1,2,3},and 
hw, t is the conditional variance of the monthly return of the stock market index of the 
world at time t. 
 
Model (B2) was first introduced by Bollerslev, Engle, and Wooldridge (1988). As in 
Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987), the weights of the lagged residual vectors are taken to 
be 1/2, 1/3, and 1/6, respectively. The constants a2 , b2 , and c2 are constrained to be 
identical for all country-world pairs. Maximum likelihood is used to estimate model (B2). 
 
The other independent variable in model (1) –  φi , t  – measures the level of integration of 
country i at time t. We define it as follows: 
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The definition of φi , t in (B3) implies that it is a function of the ratio of the sum of exports 
and imports to gross domestic product. It is designed to take on values between zero and 
one. When its value is zero, the country is not integrated with world equity markets, and 
its equity is exposed only to local risk (own variance). When its value is one, the country 
is fully integrated with world equity markets, and its equity is exposed only to global risk 
(covariance with world factor). Bekaert and Harvey (1997) find that increases in this ratio 
are empirically associated with increased importance of the world factor relative to local 
risk factors. 
 
We use a two-step procedure (first remove the effect of risk, and then test the effect on 
residuals) instead of using a one-step procedure (include all independent variables in 
model (B1) directly). We do so because of technical convergence problems in the one-
step non-linear estimation procedure.  If the capital market governance variables have no 
incremental effect on the cost of equity, then those variables will be orthogonal to the 
residuals from the model in (B1). We control for other influences on this residual. The 
advantage of using a well-specified asset pricing factor model like (B1) to measure cost 
of equity is that we explicitly account for risk.  This comes at a price. Recall that all the 
independent variables in model (B1) are estimates from other models. This introduces 
estimation error, which reduces power and may introduce bias. 
Countries Earnings Opacity Short Selling Put Options Insider Trading Enforcement
Capital 
Market 
Governance
Cost of 
equity
Expected 
return
Vol/Cap 
(turnover) Market depth Volatility Syncronicity
log (%US 
holdings/%
Mkt cap)
IPO 
return
Australia 6.31 1969 1982 1996 5.62 0.112 0.114 0.04 0.74 0.05 0.06 -1.47 0.12
Austria 5.31 1969 1991 No 4.77 0.154 0.087 0.04 0.88 0.05 0.09 -0.84 0.06
Belgium 6.59 1969 1992 1994 6.22 0.113 0.093 0.01 0.32 0.04 0.15 -1.98 0.15
Brazil 6.63 No 1984 1978 8.54 No 0.177 No No 0.08 0.16 -1.19 0.79
Canada 6.51 1969 1975 1976 8.50 0.054 0.108 0.03 0.95 0.03 0.06 -1.15 0.06
Chile 4.00 No 1994 1996 5.00 0.047 0.077 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.21 -2.10 0.09
Denmark 5.64 1969 1990 1996 5.48 0.139 0.094 0.02 0.45 0.04 0.07 -1.49 0.05
Finland 5.72 No 1988 1993 6.09 0.094 0.113 No No No 0.14 -0.72 0.10
France 6.36 1969 1987 1975 8.45 0.142 0.113 0.03 0.75 0.05 0.07 -1.13 0.12
Germany 5.54 1969 1990 1995 5.62 0.101 0.102 0.14 3.57 0.05 0.11 -1.77 0.28
Greece 3.11 No No 1996 1.44 0.211 0.085 0.02 0.34 0.08 0.19 -2.46 0.49
Hong Kong 5.00 1994 1993 1994 3.83 0.164 0.126 0.04 0.62 0.07 0.15 -2.24 0.17
India 3.95 No No No 0.98 0.115 0.076 0.03 0.58 0.06 0.19 -2.37 0.35
Ireland 5.16 1986 No No 4.72 0.115 0.109 No No 0.05 0.06 -0.29 No
Italy 4.41 1969 1995 1996 4.98 0.108 0.105 0.03 0.45 0.06 0.18 -1.22 0.22
Japan 4.05 1969 1989 1990 6.40 0.057 0.120 0.03 0.54 0.06 0.23 -2.52 0.28
Malaysia 4.46 1996 No 1996 1.92 -0.005 0.115 0.02 0.29 0.07 0.43 -1.77 1.04
Mexico 6.52 1969 No No 5.17 0.005 0.106 0.04 0.64 0.08 0.29 -0.65 0.33
Netherlands 5.49 1969 1978 1994 5.85 0.135 0.107 0.06 1.63 0.04 No -0.87 0.10
Norway 7.00 No 1990 1990 6.85 0.120 0.111 0.04 0.86 0.06 0.12 -0.96 0.13
Pakistan 4.38 No No No 1.13 No 0.056 No No 0.08 0.17 No No
Portugal 7.00 1986 No No 5.33 0.072 0.096 0.03 0.66 0.04 0.07 -1.33 0.11
Singapore 4.89 1969 1993 1978 7.96 0.064 0.115 0.02 0.41 0.05 0.19 -1.98 0.30
South Africa 4.74 1969 1992 No 4.58 0.091 0.111 0.02 0.37 0.06 0.20 -2.20 0.33
South Korea 3.47 No 1997 1988 4.49 -0.092 0.089 0.06 0.72 0.12 0.17 -1.71 0.74
Spain 5.94 No 1992 No 3.46 0.095 0.103 0.04 0.88 0.05 0.19 -1.74 0.11
Sweden 5.59 1993 1987 1990 6.40 0.151 0.105 0.03 0.61 0.06 0.14 -0.94 0.31
Switzerland 5.59 1969 1988 1995 5.63 0.150 0.106 0.04 1.07 0.05 No -1.25 0.35
Taiwan 4.89 1980 No 1989 7.96 0.031 0.093 0.14 1.92 0.08 0.41 -3.36 0.31
Thailand 5.29 No No 1993 3.81 -0.101 0.082 0.04 0.55 0.09 0.27 -2.43 0.47
Turkey 4.78 1995 No 1996 4.04 0.083 0.080 0.07 0.60 0.14 0.39 -1.45 0.13
United Kingdom 5.92 1969 1984 1981 8.31 0.132 0.116 0.05 1.19 0.04 0.06 -1.97 0.17
United States 7.49 1969 1973 1969 8.83 0.083 0.106 0.06 1.95 0.04 0.02 0.99 0.18
Table I
Summary Statistics, 1969-1998
 
 
 
 
 
Column 1 presents the countries in our dataset in alphabetical order.  For each country, we report 
the average CMG index value, the average of each of the three components of the index.  The 
“Earnings Opacity” score is the average of three earnings opacity decile rankings.  To construct 
this number, we rank each country-month into deciles on each of three opacity measures (earning 
aggressiveness, loss aversion, and income smoothing).  We then take the average of these three 
rankings in computing an opacity index.  Table values represent the monthly average index value 
for each country.  Higher scores indicate lower opacity (i.e. greater transparency).  The values 
associated with “Short Selling” and “Put Options” represent the date each was first allowed in a 
given country.  The “Insider Trading Enforcement” column reports the date of the first 
enforcement action against an insider for trading violations.  The liquidity variable is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of volume to market capitalization. The equity return for each country is 
computed from its stock market index. The variable market depth is the ratio of market turnover 
to return volatility. We measure volatility as either the standard deviation of daily returns 
computed each month (Volatility), or the absolute monthly return for that month (|Return|). The 
variable log(%US stockholdings/%Market Cap) is the ratio of percentage of US stockholdings in 
country i to the percentage of market capitalization in country i.  To mitigate the effect of 
outliers, we take the natural logarithm of this ratio. The variable Synchronicity, is measured as 
the average R2 of firm-level regressions of bi-weekly stock returns on local and U.S. market 
indexes in each country. The variable, IPO returns, is the initial returns accruing to investors in 
IPOs of common stock. This variable was downloaded from Jay Ritter’s web site 
(http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/). 
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Table II 
Ranking of Countries 
Earnings 
Opacity 
Insider Trading 
Enforcement 
Short 
Selling/Put 
Option 
CMG Index 
United States United States United States United States 
Portugal Brazil Australia Brazil 
Norway France Austria Canada 
Brazil Canada South Africa France 
Belgium Singapore Ireland United Kingdom 
Mexico Taiwan Canada Taiwan 
Canada United Kingdom Singapore Singapore 
France Finland Taiwan Norway 
Australia South Korea Germany Japan 
Spain Japan Mexico Sweden 
United Kingdom Norway Japan Belgium 
Finland Sweden Italy Finland 
Denmark Thailand Netherlands Netherlands 
Sweden Turkey France Switzerland 
Switzerland Malaysia Switzerland Germany 
Germany Hong Kong United Kingdom Australia 
Netherlands Belgium Denmark Denmark 
Austria Netherlands Belgium Portugal 
Thailand Switzerland Portugal Mexico 
Ireland Germany Finland Chile 
Hong Kong Chile Brazil Italy 
Taiwan Greece Sweden Austria 
Singapore Australia Norway Ireland 
Turkey Italy Spain South Africa 
South Africa Denmark Hong Kong South Korea 
Malaysia India Chile Turkey 
Italy South Africa Turkey Hong Kong 
Pakistan Portugal South Korea Thailand 
Japan Spain Malaysia Spain 
Chile Ireland Greece Malaysia 
India Pakistan Pakistan Greece 
South Korea Austria India Pakistan 
Greece Mexico Thailand India 
Countries are ranked by decreasing quality of different components of the 
CMG index (columns 1 to 3).  In ranking countries by Short selling/Put 
Option, we take the earlier of the two introduction dates.  Also reported in 
this table is the rank of each country according to the CMG index itself 
(column 4).  
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Table III 
  
 Effect of Capital Market Governance on the Cost of Equity 
(Using Dividend Yield as a proxy) 
Dependent Variable Cost of Equity 
Independent Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
CMG -0.0025     
 (-4.23)     
Insider Trading  -0.0011   -0.0005 
  (-2.71)   (-1.58) 
Earning Opacity   -0.0029  -0.0025 
   (-3.46)  (-2.98) 
Short Selling    -0.0007 -0.0005 
    (-1.99) (-1.10) 
Forex 2.4948 -0.1375 0.1006 2.4517 2.4392 
 (0.98) (-0.04) (0.03) (0.91) (0.94) 
Liquidity -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0002 -0.0009 
 (-0.82) (0.25) (-1.92) (-0.12) (-0.89) 
Liberalization -0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0024 
 (-0.65) (-0.82) (-0.61) (-0.77) (-0.45) 
Country Fixed Effects not included     
No of observations 3414 4479 3498 4375 3414 
The panel regressions with country-fixed effects are based on monthly data. They are corrected for 
country-specific heteroskedasticity and country-specific autocorrelation. t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. The dependent variable is k, the cost of equity.  It is defined as follows. It is computed as the 
sum of the dividend yield forecast and the growth rate of the dividend. The "CMG" variable is capital 
market governance and it consists of three different elements: (1) the level of earning opacity, (2) 
enforcement of insider trading laws, and (3) short-selling restrictions. The indicator variable 
“liberalization” changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date that was 
obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). The liquidity variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
volume to market capitalization. "Forex" is the conditional covariance of the return of the stock market 
index with the depreciation of the ith  foreign currency with respect to the dollar at time t. It is estimated 
using a multivariate ARCH model. The equity data for developed countries are from Morgan Stanley 
Capital International, and the equity data for emerging markets are from International Financial 
Corporation.  
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Table IV 
Effect of Capital Market Governance on the Cost of Equity 
(Using an International Asset Pricing Model) 
 
Model 1: 
The international asset pricing factor model used for risk-adjusting is 
 ( ) ( ) titititwititfti ehhrr ,,var,,,cov,0,, 1 ++++=− λφλφα  
where the measure of integration of country i at time t, φ i,t , is defined in the text. λ cov is the price of the covariance risk with the 
world, and λ var is the price of own country variance risk. The independent variables are the conditional covariances and variances, 
hi,w, t and hi, t , respectively, and these are obtained from the multivariate ARCH model as defined in the text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Panel B, the dependent variable is the monthly equity return for each country minus the one mounth U.S. T-Bill return.   The equity 
return for each country is computed from its stock market index.  Data on monthly stock market indices for the 20 developed markets 
were obtained from Morgan Stanley Capital Market International (MSCI).  Data on monthly stock market indices for the 14 emerging 
markets were obtained from the International Financial Corporation (IFC).  The data for the one-month U.S. Treasury bill return was 
obtained from Datastream.  The measure of a country’s integration with the world, as defined above, is computed from its exports, 
imports, and GDP.   It is equation (3) in the text.  Data on quarterly/annual GDP, monthly exports and monthly imports were from the 
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.  The statistics for Taiwan come from Datastream.   
 
The conditional covariance of the return of the stock market index with the depreciation of the ith  foreign currency with respect to the 
dollar at time t, defined as the foreign exchange risk and denoted as hi,ifx, t , is estimated from the multivariate ARCH model as defined 
in the text. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
 
Panel B: Effect on Residuals (risk Adjusted)     
Dependent Variable  Residual from Risk Adjustment Model 
Independent Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
CMG -0.0028     
 (-3.07)     
Insider Trading  -0.0017   -0.0009 
  (-4.30)   (-1.76) 
Earning Opacity   -0.0004  0.0002 
   (-0.46)  (0.23) 
Short Selling    -0.0015 -0.0013 
    (-2.57) (-1.82) 
Forex 7.2954 5.9985 7.1289 6.0448 7.2660 
 (5.34) (4.26) (5.15) (4.33) (5.32) 
Liquidity 0.0054 0.0080 0.0032 0.0075 0.0053 
 (3.05) (5.30) (1.84) (5.12) (2.94) 
Liberalization -0.0076 -0.0200 -0.0076 -0.0205 -0.0080 
 (-0.73) (-2.72) (-0.72) (-2.81) (-0.76) 
country fixed effects not reported      
No of observations 3200 4214 3272 4121 3200 
Panel A: Some coefficients of the risk-adjustment model, MODEL 1  
Parameter  Coefficient  p-value 
α0 0.0011 0.5534 
α1 15.6094 0.0283 
λcov 2.2157 0.0471 
λvar 2.3984 0.0615 
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Table V 
 Effect of Capital Market Governance on Trading Volume 
           
Dependent Variable Vol/Cap (Turnover) 
Independent Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
CMG 0.0040     
 (3.75)     
Insider Trading  0.0020   0.0019 
  (4.91)   (3.39) 
Earning Opacity   0.0012  0.0004 
   (1.73)  (0.71) 
Short Selling    0.0021 0.0002 
    (4.93) (0.24) 
Liberalization 0.0133 0.0097 0.0161 0.0100 0.0147 
 (2.38) (1.66) (3.22) (1.71) (2.44) 
country fixed effects not reported      
No of observations 3469 4720 3553 4615 3469 
 
The panel regressions with country fixed-effects are based on monthly data.  They are corrected for 
country-specific heteroskedasticity and country-specific autocorrelation. t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. The dependent variable is Vol/Cap, and it is the ratio of volume to market capitalization. 
The first independent variable is "CMG". "CMG" is capital market governance and it consists of three 
different elements: 1- the level of earning opacity, 2- enforcement of insider trading laws, and 3- short-
selling restrictions. The next three independent variables are the three components of CMG. The fifth 
independent variable is the liberalization variable. It is coded as follows. The indicator variable 
“liberalization” changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date that was 
obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). The equity data for developed countries are from Morgan 
Stanley Capital International, and the equity data for emerging markets are from International Financial 
Corporation. 
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Table VI 
 Effect of Capital Market Governance on Market Depth 
        
  Market Depth   
Dependent Variable Turnover/Volatility Turnover/|Return| Volatility
Independent Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7)
CMG 0.0791     0.1438 0.0024 
 (2.83)     (2.69) (1.93) 
Insider Trading  0.0304   0.0205   
  (1.35)   (0.94)   
Earning Opacity   0.0419  0.0417   
   (4.17)  (3.16)   
Short Selling    0.0324 -0.0090   
    (3.04) (-0.59)   
Liberalization 0.1366 0.2004 0.0335 0.0492 0.1368 0.3863 -0.0042 
 (4.08) (8.68) (0.45) (0.54) (3.79) (3.02) (-2.84) 
country fixed effects not reported       
No of observations 3385 3469 4562 4457 3385 3355 3865 
 
The panel regressions with country fixed-effects are based on monthly data.  They are corrected for 
country-specific heteroskedasticity and country-specific autocorrelation. t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. The dependent variable in the first six models is market depth, defined as the ratio of market 
turnover to return volatility.  Market turnover is volume/market cap as defined in Table V.  We measure 
volatility as either the standard deviation of daily returns computed each month (Volatility), or the absolute 
monthly return for that month (|Return|).  In Model 7, the dependent variable is Volatility. 
 
The first independent variable is "CMG". "CMG" is capital market governance and it consists of three 
different elements: 1- the level of earning opacity, 2- enforcement of insider trading laws, and 3- short-
selling restrictions. The next three independent variables are the three components of CMG. The fifth 
independent variable is the liberalization variable. It is coded as follows. The indicator variable 
“liberalization” changes from zero to one in the month after the official liberalization date that was 
obtained from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). The equity data for developed countries are from Morgan 
Stanley Capital International, and the equity data for emerging markets are from International Financial 
Corporation.  
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Table VII 
 Effect of Earnings Opacity on US Foreign Stockholdings 
           
Dependent Variable % US stockholdings/ % Market Cap 
Independent Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
CMG 0.1386     
 (1.72)     
Insider Trading  0.3132   0.3122 
  (2.69)   (2.20) 
Earning Opacity   0.0813  0.0750 
   (1.65)  (1.35) 
Short Selling    0.0284 -0.0183 
    (0.94) (-0.50) 
Acctstand -0.0083 0.0054 -0.0113 -0.0005 -0.0072 
 (-0.40) (0.31) (-0.63) (-0.03) (-0.36) 
Antidir -0.0431 0.0329 0.0516 0.1208 -0.0585 
 (-0.26) (0.24) (0.44) (1.03) (-0.39) 
Judsys -0.0211 -0.0377 0.0202 0.0005 -0.0201 
 (-0.25) (-0.49) (0.27) (0.01) (-0.25) 
French Law -0.3523 -0.0721 -0.0005 0.0954 -0.2734 
 (-0.58) (-0.15) (-0.0) (0.21) (-0.52) 
German Law -0.6291 -0.1353 -0.4166 -0.3489 -0.2737 
 (-1.24) (-0.32) (-1.01) (-0.82) (-0.60) 
Scandinavian Law 0.2234 0.2333 0.4094 0.4136 0.2150 
 (0.50) (0.57) (1.01) (0.99) (0.52) 
country fixed effects not reported     
No of observations 29 29 32 32 29 
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Foreign stockholdings by US citizens for 1997 are from Bhattacharya and Groznik (2003). The data are 
from the survey carried out by the U.S. Treasury Department and the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. The dependent variable is the ratio of percentage of US stockholdings in country i to the 
percentage of market capitalization in country i.  To mitigate the effect of outliers, we take the natural 
logarithm of this ratio. The first independent variable is "CMG". "CMG" is capital market governance and 
it consists of three different elements: 1- the level of earning opacity, 2- enforcement of insider trading 
laws, and 3- short-selling restrictions. The next three independent variables are the three components of 
CMG. We control for three variables that were featured in La Porta et al. (1998) as measures of the level of 
corporate governance and protection of minority shareholder rights.  Judsys is a measure of the efficacy of 
the judicial system, ranging from 0 (least efficient) to 10 (most efficient).  Antidir is an aggregate index 
developed by La Porta et al. (1998) to capture shareholder rights within a country.  Acctstand is a crude 
measure of the quality of financial reporting in a country, based on the inclusion or omission of 90 items in 
seven categories. We also use binary variables that represent the legal origin of the different countries 
(English, French, German and Scandinavian legal regimes.) The equity data for developed countries are 
from Morgan Stanley Capital International, and the equity data for emerging markets are from International 
Financial Corporation. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
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Table VIII 
 Effect of Earnings Opacity on Stock Synchronicity 
           
Dependent Variable Stock Price Synchronicity 
Independent Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
CMG -0.0224     
 (-2.05)     
Insider Trading  -0.0354   -0.0252 
  (-2.04)   (-1.14) 
Earning Opacity   0.0013  -0.0044 
   (0.19)  (-0.52) 
Short Selling    -0.0065 -0.0034 
    (-1.62) (-0.62) 
Acctstand 0.0708 0.0167 -0.0373 -0.0262 0.0322 
 (0.86) (0.23) (-0.54) (-0.40) (0.40) 
Antidir 0.1113 0.0324 0.0200 0.0424 0.0581 
 (1.59) (0.51) (0.32) (0.70) (0.80) 
Judsys 0.0057 -0.0004 -0.0224 -0.0295 -0.0111 
 (0.09) (-0.01) (-0.36) (-0.50) (-0.17) 
French Law 0.0062 0.0039 0.0013 0.0020 0.0047 
 (2.20) (1.51) (0.54) (0.88) (1.55) 
German Law 0.0070 -0.0062 -0.0210 -0.0223 -0.0027 
 (0.31) (-0.30) (-1.08) (-1.25) (-0.11) 
Scandinavian Law -0.0290 -0.0293 -0.0299 -0.0240 -0.0271 
 (-2.55) (-2.58) (-2.68) (-2.18) (-2.19) 
country fixed effects not reported     
No of observations 28 28 32 32 28 
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The dependent variable, Stock Price Synchronicity, is measured as the average R2 of firm-level regressions 
of bi-weekly stock returns on local and U.S. market indexes in each country. The first independent variable 
is "CMG". "CMG" is capital market governance and it consists of three different elements: 1- the level of 
earning opacity, 2- enforcement of insider trading laws, and 3- short-selling restrictions. The next three 
independent variables are the three components of CMG. We control for three variables that were featured 
in La Porta et al. (1998) as measures of the level of corporate governance and protection of minority 
shareholder rights.  Judsys is a measure of the efficacy of the judicial system, ranging from 0 (least 
efficient) to 10 (most efficient).  Antidir is an aggregate index developed by La Porta et al. (1998) to 
capture shareholder rights within a country.  Acctstand is a crude measure of the quality of financial 
reporting in a country, based on the inclusion or omission of 90 items in seven categories. We also use 
binary variables that represent the legal origin of the different countries (English, French, German and 
Scandinavian legal regimes.) The equity data for developed countries are from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International, and the equity data for emerging markets are from International Financial Corporation. t-
statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
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Table IX 
 Effect of Earnings Opacity on IPO returns 
           
Dependent Variable IPO returns 
Independent Variables Model (1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
CMG -0.0586     
 (-3.01)     
Insider Trading  -0.0771   -0.0395 
  (-2.37)   (-1.03) 
Earning Opacity   -0.0101  0.0044 
   (-0.84)  (0.30) 
Short Selling    -0.0189 -0.0187 
    (-2.65) (-1.91) 
Acctstand -0.0914 -0.2421 -0.2414 -0.1946 -0.2270 
 (-0.66) (-1.84) (-2.08) (-1.85) (-1.72) 
Antidir 0.1097 -0.0788 -0.0129 0.0465 -0.0244 
 (0.90) (-0.67) (-0.12) (0.46) (-0.20) 
Judsys -0.1435 -0.1749 -0.2037 -0.1998 -0.2165 
 (-1.31) (-1.53) (-1.79) (-1.98) (-1.92) 
French Law 0.0130 0.0071 0.0091 0.0090 0.0068 
 (2.60) (1.46) (1.86) (2.13) (1.28) 
German Law -0.0257 -0.0667 -0.0639 -0.0740 -0.0750 
 (-0.66) (-1.78) (-1.85) (-2.42) (-1.89) 
Scandinavian Law -0.0342 -0.0352 -0.0485 -0.0333 -0.0209 
 (-1.78) (-1.71) (-2.49) (-1.80) (-0.99) 
country fixed effects not reported     
No of observations 30 30 33 33 30 
 
The dependent variable, IPO returns, is the initial returns accruing to investors in IPOs of common stock. 
This variable was downloaded from Jay Ritter’s web site (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/). The first 
independent variable is "CMG". "CMG" is capital market governance and it consists of three different 
elements: 1- the level of earning opacity, 2- enforcement of insider trading laws, and 3- short-selling 
restrictions. The next three independent variables are the three components of CMG. We control for three 
variables that were featured in La Porta et al. (1998) as measures of the level of corporate governance and 
protection of minority shareholder rights.  Judsys is a measure of the efficacy of the judicial system, 
ranging from 0 (least efficient) to 10 (most efficient).  Antidir is an aggregate index developed by La Porta 
et al. (1998) to capture shareholder rights within a country.  Acctstand is a crude measure of the quality of 
financial reporting in a country, based on the inclusion or omission of 90 items in seven categories. We also 
use binary variables that represent the legal origin of the different countries (English, French, German and 
Scandinavian legal regimes.) The equity data for developed countries are from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International, and the equity data for emerging markets are from International Financial Corporation. t-
statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
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Figure 1: Capital Market Governance Measures 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Insider 
Trading 
2. Earning 
Opacity 
3. Short 
Selling 
Constraint
1.1 Insider Trading Dummy 
Insider trading dummy is zero if 
insider trading law has never 
been enforced and ten if it was 
enforced. 
 
Capital Market Governance 
2.1 Earning Aggressiveness 
The ratio of Accruals to Total 
Asset. The higher is this ratio, 
the higher is earning 
aggressiveness. 
 
2.2 Loss Avoidance  
The number of firms with 
small positive earnings minus 
the number of firms with 
small negative earnings, all 
divided by their sum.  The 
higher is this ratio, the higher 
is the loss avoidance. 
 
2.3 Earning Smoothing 
Correlation between change in 
accruals and change in cash 
flows.  The higher is this ratio, 
the higher is earning 
smoothing. 
 
3.1 Short Selling Constraint 
A dummy which equals ten after short 
selling became feasible in a country.  
 
3.2  Put Option 
A dummy which equals ten after the 
date when put option became feasible. 
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Figure 2: Market Performance Measures and Their Empirical Proxies 
 
 
  
1. Cost of 
Capital 
2. Market 
Liquidity 
3. Pricing 
Efficiency 
1.1 Implied Cost-of-capital 
The implied cost of equity 
capital, derived from current 
market price and a dividend 
discount model. 
 
1.2  Average Realized Returns  
The average realized returns, 
based on an international asset 
pricing model (Bekaert and 
Harvey (1995)) 
Market Performance 
2.1 Trading Volume 
The ratio of dollar traded per 
month to the dollar market 
capitalization at the end of the 
month. 
 
2.2  Market Depth  
The ratio of trading volume to 
the standard deviation of daily 
returns (or the absolute value 
of monthly return) computed 
each month. 
 
2.3 U.S. Foreign Investment 
The over (under) weight in 
stockholdings by U.S. 
investors, relative to that 
country’s weight in a global 
index. 
3.1 Stock Price Synchronicity 
The average R2 from firm-level 
regressions of bi-weekly stock returns 
on local and U. S. market indices in 
each country (Morck, Yeung and Yu 
(2000)).  This variable measures the 
ratio of firm-specific to market-level 
information.  Countries with higher 
average R2 are deemed to be less 
efficient. 
 
3.2  IPO Underpricing  
Based on the average initial-day 
returns on IPOs. Countries with larger 
IPO underpricing are deemed to be 
less efficient. 
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Figure 3: Capital Market Governance, Liquidity, and Cost of Equity 
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This figure depicts the time-series of CMG, liquidity, and cost of equity, averaged over all countries.  CMG is our measure of capital 
market governance, based on three elements: (1) the degree of earning opacity, (2) the enforcement of insider trading laws, and (3) the 
relaxation of short-selling restrictions.  Liquidity is the ratio of trading volume to market capitalization; Cost of Equity is excess return 
based on an international asset pricing model.  For presentation, we normalize all three time series to a value of one in 1992.   

